The multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands: competitive equilibria

Daniel Jaume (), Jordi Masso and Alejandro Neme ()

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2012, vol. 76, issue 2, 187 pages

Abstract: A multiple-partners assignment game with heterogeneous sales and multi-unit demands consists of a set of sellers that own a given number of indivisible units of potentially many different goods and a set of buyers who value those units and want to buy at most an exogenously fixed number of units. We define a competitive equilibrium for this generalized assignment game and prove its existence by using only linear programming. In particular, we show how to compute equilibrium price vectors from the solutions of the dual linear program associated to the primal linear program defined to find optimal assignments. Using only linear programming tools, we also show (i) that the set of competitive equilibria (pairs of price vectors and assignments) has a Cartesian product structure: each equilibrium price vector is part of a competitive equilibrium with all optimal assignments, and vice versa; (ii) that the set of (restricted) equilibrium price vectors has a natural lattice structure; and (iii) how this structure is translated into the set of agents’ utilities that are attainable at equilibrium. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Keywords: Matching; Assignment game; Indivisible goods; Competitive equilibrium; Lattice (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00186-012-0395-4 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
Working Paper: The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sales and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria (2010)
Working Paper: The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria (2009)
Working Paper: The Multiple-partners Assignment Game with Heterogeneous Sells and Multi-unit Demands: Competitive Equilibria
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mathme:v:76:y:2012:i:2:p:161-187

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/00186

DOI: 10.1007/s00186-012-0395-4

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research is currently edited by Oliver Stein

More articles in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research from Springer, Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR), Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().