A bankruptcy approach to the core cover
A. Estévez-Fernández,
M. Fiestras-Janeiro (fiestras@uvigo.es),
M. Mosquera and
E. Sánchez-Rodríguez
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Arantza Estévez Fernández
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2012, vol. 76, issue 3, 343-359
Abstract:
In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2012
Keywords: Cooperative game theory; Compromise admissible games; Bankruptcy; Core cover; Complexity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mathme:v:76:y:2012:i:3:p:343-359
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DOI: 10.1007/s00186-012-0409-2
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