Fall back equilibrium for $$2 \times n$$ bimatrix games

John Kleppe (), Peter Borm and Ruud Hendrickx

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2013, vol. 78, issue 2, 186 pages

Abstract: In this paper we provide a characterization of the set of fall back equilibria for $$2 \times n$$ bimatrix games. Furthermore, for this type of games we discuss the relation between the set of fall back equilibria and the sets of perfect, proper and strictly perfect equilibria. In order to do this we reformulate the existing characterizations for these three equilibrium concepts by the use of refinement-specific subgames. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Keywords: Game theory; Fall back equilibrium; $$2 \times n$$ bimatrix game; Equilibrium refinement; C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00186-013-0438-5 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mathme:v:78:y:2013:i:2:p:171-186

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/00186

DOI: 10.1007/s00186-013-0438-5

Access Statistics for this article

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research is currently edited by Oliver Stein

More articles in Mathematical Methods of Operations Research from Springer, Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR), Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB)
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().