The equity core and the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core

Francesc Llerena () and Cori Vilella ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Francesc Llerena Garrés

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2015, vol. 81, issue 2, 235-244

Abstract: In this note, we give a geometrical decomposition of the equity core as a finite union of polyhedrons. As a consequence, we characterize the non-emptiness of the equity core (Selten in Decision theory and social ethics: issues in social choice, Reidel, Dordrecht, 289–301, 1978 ) and provide a method, easy to implement, for computing the Lorenz-maximal allocations in the equal division core (Dutta and Ray in Games Econ Behav 3:403–422, 1991 ). Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Cooperative game; Equity core; Equal division core; Lorenz domination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s00186-015-0494-0

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