On the 1-nucleolus
A. Estévez-Fernández (),
Peter Borm (),
M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro,
M. A. Mosquera and
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A. Estévez-Fernández: Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
M. G. Fiestras-Janeiro: Universidade de Vigo
M. A. Mosquera: Universidade de Vigo
E. Sánchez-Rodríguez: Universidade de Vigo
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Arantza Estévez Fernández
Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2017, vol. 86, issue 2, 309-329
Abstract This paper analyzes the 1-nucleolus and, in particular, its relation to the nucleolus. It is seen that, contrary to the nucleolus, the 1-nucleolus can be computed in polynomial time due to a characterization using a combination of standard bankruptcy rules for associated bankruptcy problems. Sufficient conditions on a compromise stable game are derived such that the 1-nucleolus and the nucleolus coincide.
Keywords: 1-nucleolus; Compromise stable games; Aumann–Maschler rule; Nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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