Facets of the cone of totally balanced games

Tomáš Kroupa () and Milan Studený
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Tomáš Kroupa: Institute of Information Theory and Automation
Milan Studený: Institute of Information Theory and Automation

Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, 2019, vol. 90, issue 2, No 6, 300 pages

Abstract: Abstract The class of totally balanced games is a class of transferable-utility coalitional games providing important models of cooperative behavior used in mathematical economics. They coincide with market games of Shapley and Shubik and every totally balanced game is also representable as the minimum of a finite set of additive games. In this paper we characterize the polyhedral cone of totally balanced games by describing its facets. Our main result is that there is a correspondence between facet-defining inequalities for the cone and the class of special balanced systems of coalitions, the so-called irreducible min-balanced systems. Our method is based on refining the notion of balancedness introduced by Shapley. We also formulate a conjecture about what are the facets of the cone of exact games, which addresses an open problem appearing in the literature.

Keywords: Coalitional game; Totally balanced game; Balanced system; Polyhedral cone (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s00186-019-00672-y

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