EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Optimal strategies for two-person normalized matrix game with variable payoffs

Ajay Kumar Bhurjee () and Geetanjali Panda ()
Additional contact information
Ajay Kumar Bhurjee: National Institute of Science and Technology
Geetanjali Panda: Indian Institute of Technology Kharagpur

Operational Research, 2017, vol. 17, issue 2, No 9, 547-562

Abstract: Abstract This paper considers a two-person zero-sum game model in which payoffs are varying in closed intervals. Conditions for the existence of saddle point for this model is studied in this paper. Further, a methodology is developed to obtain the optimal strategy for this game as well as the range of the corresponding optimal values. The theoretical development is verified through numerical example.

Keywords: Zero-sum game; Interval optimization problem; Saddle point; Partial ordering; Interval equation; 91A05; 91A10; 91A35; 91A80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12351-016-0237-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:operea:v:17:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s12351-016-0237-x

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.springer ... search/journal/12351

DOI: 10.1007/s12351-016-0237-x

Access Statistics for this article

Operational Research is currently edited by Nikolaos F. Matsatsinis, John Psarras and Constantin Zopounidis

More articles in Operational Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().

 
Page updated 2025-03-20
Handle: RePEc:spr:operea:v:17:y:2017:i:2:d:10.1007_s12351-016-0237-x