Analysis of strategies for substitutable and complementary products in a two-levels fuzzy supply chain system
Raghu Nandan Giri (),
Shyamal Kumar Mondal () and
Manoranjan Maiti ()
Additional contact information
Raghu Nandan Giri: Vidyasagar University
Shyamal Kumar Mondal: Vidyasagar University
Manoranjan Maiti: Vidyasagar University
Operational Research, 2021, vol. 21, issue 1, No 18, 485-524
Abstract In this paper, the pricing competition models have been studied between two substitutable and one complementary products in a two-echelon fuzzy supply chain system. Here, three manufacturers separately (one each) produce and sell their products through a common retailer in the cooperative and non-cooperative markets. The demand for each product depends linearly on the products’ prices. Here, manufacturing costs, base demands and price elasticity are characterized as fuzzy parameters. The closed-form expressions of optimal wholesale and retail pricing decisions have been derived for four different market situations under game theory to maximize the expected profit function of each participant of the supply chain. Sharing of profits under co-operation mechanism amongst the manufacturers and retailer in different proportions are presented numerically for the fuzzy model. As particular cases, the optimal pricing decisions have been derived for two substitutable products or two complementary products separately and the results of previous investigators are presented. In addition, the traditional deterministic version of the fuzzy problem is numerically solved. The results of fuzzy and crisp models are presented and compared. Finally, the problem is illustrated with some numerical data for four market situations, sensitivity analyses are performed and management decisions are explored. The products’ demands and supply chain profits are graphically presented for different price elasticity of the substitutable and complementary products.
Keywords: Supply chain; Fuzzy variable; Substitutable products; Complementary products; Stackelberg game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12351-018-0443-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:operea:v:21:y:2021:i:1:d:10.1007_s12351-018-0443-9
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.springer ... search/journal/12351
Access Statistics for this article
Operational Research is currently edited by Nikolaos F. Matsatsinis, John Psarras and Constantin Zopounidis
More articles in Operational Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().