Dynamic Stackelberg duopoly with sticky prices and a myopic follower

Katarzyna Kańska () and Agnieszka Wiszniewska-Matyszkiel
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Katarzyna Kańska: University of Warsaw

Operational Research, 2022, vol. 22, issue 4, No 33, 4252 pages

Abstract: Abstract In this paper, we study a model of a market with asymmetric information and sticky prices—the dynamic Stackelberg model with a myopic follower and infinite time horizon of Fujiwara ("Economics Bulletin" 12(12), 1–9 (2006)). We perform a comprehensive analysis of the equilibria instead of concentrating on the steady state only. We study both the equilibria for open loop and feedback information structure, which turn out to coincide, and we compare the results with the results for Cournot-Nash equilibria.

Keywords: Differential games; Dynamic market model; Myopic-follower Stackelberg equilibrium; Cournot-Nash equilibrium; Sticky prices; 91B54; 91B24; 91A23; 91A10; 90C39; 49L12; 49L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s12351-021-00665-y

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