Optimal strategies of social commerce platforms in the context of forwarding and bargaining

Xu Chen (), Yingliang Wu () and Rujie Zhong ()
Additional contact information
Xu Chen: South China University of Technology
Yingliang Wu: South China University of Technology
Rujie Zhong: University of Edinburgh

Operational Research, 2023, vol. 23, issue 2, No 2, 28 pages

Abstract: Abstract “Forwarding and bargaining” is a new marketing pattern in social commerce that fully utilizes consumers’ social relationships and offers an alternative for enterprises struggling with traditional e-commerce platforms. In this paper, we assume a Stackelberg game model between a social commerce platform and an e-commerce enterprise to investigate their strategy changes in four scenarios under the forwarding and bargaining context. Our results show that (1) platforms in the early-mid stage tend to adopt a subsidy strategy to obtain massive user and traffic benefits; (2) for enterprises operating high-quality but low-added-value products, it is unnecessary to join a developed social commerce platform; (3) platforms as direct beneficiaries can always gain more profits than can enterprises from increased traffic benefits; and (4) platforms desire to reduce the forwarding cost, whereas enterprises favour maintaining a higher one.

Keywords: Social commerce platform; Forwarding behaviour; Game theory; Traffic benefit; Forwarding cost; 90B50; 90C30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12351-023-00768-8 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:operea:v:23:y:2023:i:2:d:10.1007_s12351-023-00768-8

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.springer ... search/journal/12351

DOI: 10.1007/s12351-023-00768-8

Access Statistics for this article

Operational Research is currently edited by Nikolaos F. Matsatsinis, John Psarras and Constantin Zopounidis

More articles in Operational Research from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().