Pricing strategies for dual-channel supply chain members under pandemic demand disruptions

Sarin Raju (), T. M. Rofin () and S. Pavan Kumar ()
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Sarin Raju: St. Joseph’s Institute of Management
T. M. Rofin: Indian Institute of Management
S. Pavan Kumar: National Institute of Technology Karnataka

Operational Research, 2025, vol. 25, issue 2, No 36, 39 pages

Abstract: Abstract The COVID-19 pandemic created an unprecedented disruption and has checked the robustness of the global supply chains. This article, for the first time, addresses a Dual Channel Supply Chain (DCSC) competition between an upstream manufacturer and downstream traditional retail stores (r-store) and electronic stores (e-store) under pandemic-induced demand disruptions. We employed the Stackelberg game to model the multi-agent interaction among the upstream manufacturer and downstream r-store and e-store. The competitive subgame between r-store and e-store was modelled using a horizontal Nash game, assuming their comparable channel power. To assess the impact of demand disruption, the benchmark pre-pandemic setting was compared against panic buying, lock-down, and post-lock-down situations in alignment with the actual occurrence of events. The optimal pricing strategies and consequent profit functions of all the channel members were derived by conducting an equilibrium analysis. Further, a computational analysis using Monte-Carlo simulation was conducted to obtain managerial insights. The study found that r-store profited the most during the panic buying period, except for high-cost products. On the other hand, the e-store benefited significantly during the post-lock-down period. The lock-down period was unfavorable for both r-store and e-store. Manufacturers achieved maximum profits during panic buying, especially for essential goods. Both lock-down and post-lock-down periods were less favourable for the upstream channel partner. Findings from the study will aid the management practitioners in developing policies to make the DCSC robust during pandemic disruptions.

Keywords: Dual-channel supply chain; Game theory; COVID-19; Demand disruption; Panic buying; E-commerce (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s12351-025-00935-z

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