Waste products recycling mechanism design considering CSR and government subsidy

Guoli Wang (), Boxiao Hua and Junyan Wang ()
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Guoli Wang: Tianjin University of Science and Technology
Boxiao Hua: Tianjin University of Science and Technology
Junyan Wang: Tianjin University of Science and Technology

Operational Research, 2026, vol. 26, issue 1, No 4, 36 pages

Abstract: Abstract Waste products recycling and its mechanism design are receiving increasing attention. This paper focuses on the examination of a closed-loop supply chain, including a manufacturer, a retailer and a third-party, while also exploring the impacts of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and government subsidy on all participants and the waste products recycling mechanism design. Three Stackelberg game models are established to solve the optimal decision-making problem: recycling model without considering CSR and government subsidy (DA), recycling model with considering manufacturer’s CSR (DB), and recycling model with considering manufacturer’s CSR and government subsidy (DC). The study shows that, there exists the sharing ratio on the interval from 0 to 0.5 that can maximize the supply chain’s profit under DA model. While considering manufacturer’s goal of pursuing social welfare (DB, DC), it is essential to ensure the sharing ratio on the interval from zero and two-thirds to maximize the overall profit. Whichever model, larger sharing ratio will result in lower recycling rate. The retailer and third-party tend to expect manufacturer to have certain awareness of CSR, as well as certain government subsidy to maximize their respective profits. Lastly, numerical analysis is employed in this paper to confirm the derived conclusions.

Keywords: Waste products recycling; Mechanism design; Government subsidy; CSR; Closed-loop supply chain; Revenue sharing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2026
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DOI: 10.1007/s12351-025-00996-0

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