Sequential claim games

Qianqian Kong () and Hans Peters
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Qianqian Kong: Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics

OR Spectrum: Quantitative Approaches in Management, 2023, vol. 45, issue 3, No 7, 955-975

Abstract: Abstract We consider the estate division or bankruptcy problem and assume that players sequentially put claims on the estate. Each part of the estate is then divided proportionally with respect to the number of claims on it. We focus on myopic play: players first claim the hitherto least claimed parts, and on subgame perfect equilibria. Our main result is that myopic strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium if punishments for deviators are included.

Keywords: Game theory; Estate division; Sequential claim game; Myopic play; Subgame perfect equilibrium; 91A10; 91A25 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s00291-023-00711-5

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