Personalized Medicine and Pay for Performance: Should Pharmaceutical Firms be Fully Penalized when Treatment Fails?

Fernando Antoñanzas (), Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas and Carmelo A. Juárez-Castelló
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Fernando Antoñanzas: University of La Rioja
Roberto Rodríguez-Ibeas: University of La Rioja
Carmelo A. Juárez-Castelló: University of La Rioja

PharmacoEconomics, 2018, vol. 36, issue 7, No 2, 733-743

Abstract: Abstract In this article, we model the behavior of a pharmaceutical firm that has marketing authorization for a new therapy believed to be a candidate for personalized use in a subset of patients, but that lacks information as to why a response is seen only in some patients. We characterize the optimal outcome-based reimbursement policy a health authority should follow to encourage the pharmaceutical firm to undertake research and development activities to generate the information needed to effectively stratify patients. Consistent with the literature, we find that for a pharmaceutical firm that does not undertake research and development activities, when the treatment fails, the total price of the drug must be returned to the healthcare system (full penalization). By contrast, if the firm undertakes research and development activities that make the implementation of personalized medicine possible, treatment failure should not be fully penalized. Surprisingly, in some cases, particularly for high-efficacy drugs and small target populations, the optimal policy may not require any penalty for treatment failure. To illustrate the main results of the analysis, we provide a numerical simulation and a graphical analysis.

JEL-codes: I11 I18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s40273-018-0619-4

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