Getting the Price Right: Lessons for Medicare Price Negotiation from Peer Countries
Leah Z. Rand () and
Aaron S. Kesselheim
Additional contact information
Leah Z. Rand: Brigham and Women’s Hospital
Aaron S. Kesselheim: Brigham and Women’s Hospital
PharmacoEconomics, 2022, vol. 40, issue 12, No 1, 1142 pages
Abstract:
Abstract The USA pays more for brand-name prescription drugs than any other country and new legislation from August 2022 gives Medicare the authority to directly negotiate certain drug prices with manufacturers starting in 2026—something the federal insurer had been prohibited from doing for its prior history. As the USA prepares for negotiations, we therefore surveyed how comparable industrialized countries use statutory requirements and procedures to negotiate brand-name drug prices. Guidance documents, regulations, government and academic publications were reviewed to identify the process of negotiating drug prices in peer countries that have been cited as potential examples for US payment reform: Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the UK. Processes for arriving at a final price for a drug generally fall under three approaches: statutory rebates, setting a maximum price, and arbitration between national (public) insurers and manufacturers. Each approach to price negotiation could be adopted by Medicare and reduce spending even if Medicare does not adopt an exclusionary or closed formulary. Much remains to be determined about how the new price negotiation authority in the USA will be implemented, and policymakers can learn from comparator countries’ statutory and regulatory strategies for price negotiation.
Date: 2022
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s40273-022-01195-x Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:pharme:v:40:y:2022:i:12:d:10.1007_s40273-022-01195-x
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/40273
DOI: 10.1007/s40273-022-01195-x
Access Statistics for this article
PharmacoEconomics is currently edited by Timothy Wrightson and Christopher I. Carswell
More articles in PharmacoEconomics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().