 Interregional transfers: A political-economy CGE approachNicolaas Groenewold, Alfred Hagger and John Madden Papers in Regional Science, 2003, vol. 82, issue 4, 535-554 Abstract: We model the effects of changes in a federal government’s inter-regional transfers within the context of a CGE model of a federal system in which regional governments act to maximise the welfare of the residents of their region subject to the effects of their decision on regional economic outcomes. Regional governments are modelled as players in a non-cooperative game. Simulations are conducted with six versions of a small two-region model, each calibrated for a particular Australian state and the rest of the nation. We show that a change in the level of transfers has little influence on per-capita private consumption, government consumption and welfare, and that its main effect is to induce migration from the donor region to the recipient region. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2003 Keywords: Interregional transfers; political economy; computable general equilibrium analysis; fiscal federalism; interregional migration (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:presci:v:82:y:2003:i:4:p:535-554 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/s10110-003-0191-x Access Statistics for this article Papers in Regional Science is currently edited by Raymond J.G.M. Florax More articles in Papers in Regional Science from Springer, Regional Science Association International Contact information at EDIRC. |
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