Applying cooperative game theory to power relations

Harald Wiese ()

Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 2009, vol. 43, issue 4, 519-533

Keywords: Shapley value; Coalition functions; Norms; Violence; Power; Power-over; Market power; Emotional dependence; Communication structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s11135-007-9134-y

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