A model of state secularism

Vikas Kumar ()

Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 2014, vol. 48, issue 4, 2313-2327

Abstract: This paper posits a minimalist state interested in taxation and religion and explores the conditions conducive to the separation of state and religion. It shows that a ruler is secular and does not favour his religion as the state religion if he is absolutely tolerant, he faces a homogeneous, co-religionist society, and/or punishing violations of the state’s religious policy is prohibitively costly. Secular rulers are accordingly classified into three types: innately, coincidentally, and instrumentally secular. In the short run, individuals are equally well-off under different secular regimes. But among rulers, instrumentally secular rulers are relatively worse-off. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2014

Keywords: Economics of Religion; Secularism; Tolerance; D79; K39; Z12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s11135-013-9893-6

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