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The Stackelberg differential game for counter-terrorism

Abd El-Monem A. Megahed ()
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Abd El-Monem A. Megahed: Majmaah University

Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, 2019, vol. 53, issue 1, No 10, 207-220

Abstract: Abstract The Stackelberg approach of the differential game is important to fight terrorism, that is through government tasks such as education improvement, solving the unemployment problems, justice in the society, knowledge of true religion and the security, this approach is a hierarchical solution of a differential game, leader, and followers. This study is divided into two stages; stage 1: the government is the leader and the terrorist organization is the follower. Stage 2: the terrorist organization is the leader and government is the follower, we study the analytic form of this approach for obtaining the optimal strategy to fight terrorism.

Keywords: (I) Game theory; Fighting the terrorism; Stackelberg; Optimal strategy; 49N70; 49N90; 91A23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1007/s11135-018-0742-5

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