Equilibrium in a customer choice between observable and unobservable queues with heterogeneous servers
Bara Kim (),
Jeongsim Kim () and
Chia-Li Wang ()
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Bara Kim: Korea University
Jeongsim Kim: Chungbuk National University
Chia-Li Wang: National Dong Hwa University
Queueing Systems: Theory and Applications, 2025, vol. 109, issue 4, No 5, 27 pages
Abstract:
Abstract We consider a system with two servers, each with its own queue: one observable and the other unobservable. Upon arrival, customers choose which queue to join. It is known that a unique threshold-type equilibrium strategy exists when the service rates of the two servers are equal. Dvir, Hassin, and Haviv (2022) demonstrated that such a strategy does not always exist when the service rates differ. However, through extensive numerical experiments, they observed that a unique threshold-type equilibrium strategy exists whenever the service rate of the unobservable queue is greater than or equal to that of the observable queue. In this paper, we rigorously prove this observation.
Keywords: Censored Markov chain; Threshold-type strategy; Nash equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11134-025-09957-y
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