Discussion of “decentralized capacity management and internal pricing”

Robert F. Göx ()
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Robert F. Göx: University of Fribourg

Review of Accounting Studies, 2010, vol. 15, issue 3, No 3, 479-502

Abstract: Abstract Dutta and Reichelstein (2010) study the role of transfer pricing and organizational choice in providing incentives for efficient decisions on the acquisition and subsequent reallocation of capacity within decentralized firms. Their analysis suggests that transfer prices based on the historical cost of capacity facilitate the efficient allocation of resources. They also find that symmetric responsibility center structures are generally better suited for providing efficient investment incentives than hybrid organizations. An important condition for the derivation of the two results is the linearity of the shadow prices of capacity. If shadow prices are nonlinear, transfer prices should be below (above) the historical cost of capacity in order to counteract the managers’ incentives to underinvest (overinvest). Because profit center organizations can use transfer prices for mitigating the inefficiency caused by nonlinear shadow prices, they offer a natural advantage over pure investment center organizations in implementing efficient capacity decisions. Overall, these observations suggest that the curvature of profit functions is an important factor in determining the suitable instruments for decentralized capacity management.

Keywords: Capacity planning; Transfer pricing; Organizational form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D24 D81 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1007/s11142-010-9121-8

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