Discussion of “Are CEOs compensated for value destroying growth in earnings?”

Ingolf Dittmann ()
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Ingolf Dittmann: Erasmus University Rotterdam

Review of Accounting Studies, 2010, vol. 15, issue 3, No 7, 578-583

Abstract: Abstract This discussion provides several explanations for the evidence presented in Balachandran and Mohanram (2010) that are consistent with efficient contracting. I also show that—contrary to the suggestion of the title—CEOs do not benefit from value destroying growth in earnings. Finally, I argue that there is no conclusive evidence that corporate investments destroy value.

Keywords: Executive compensation; Profitability; Corporate investments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1007/s11142-010-9125-4

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