Discussion of “equilibrium earnings management and managerial compensation in a multiperiod agency setting”

Iván Marinovic ()
Additional contact information
Iván Marinovic: Stanford GSB

Review of Accounting Studies, 2014, vol. 19, issue 3, No 2, 1078-1085

Abstract: Abstract Dutta and Fan (Rev Account Stud, 2014), this issue, study the implications of earnings management on managerial compensation, in a two-period LEN setting. They analyze the level as well as the evolution of compensation. Furthermore, they consider the possibility of joint moral hazard and adverse selection problems. I discuss the empirical implications of their analysis, in the context of a slightly more general dynamic setting, and examine the robustness of some of their results with respect to the assumption that the principal can enforce claw-backs.

Keywords: Earnings management; contracting; LEN; Incentives; D82; D83; D84 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11142-014-9287-6 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reaccs:v:19:y:2014:i:3:d:10.1007_s11142-014-9287-6

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/accounting/journal/11142

DOI: 10.1007/s11142-014-9287-6

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Accounting Studies is currently edited by Paul Fischer

More articles in Review of Accounting Studies from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().