Discussion of “Board interlocks and the diffusion of disclosure policy”

Weining Zhang ()
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Weining Zhang: Cheung Kong Graduate School of Business

Review of Accounting Studies, 2014, vol. 19, issue 3, No 4, 1120-1124

Abstract: Abstract Cai et al. (Rev Account Stud, forthcoming, 2014) find that firms with interlocked directors are more likely to stop quarterly forecasts and that the past stopping experience of interlocked directors affects the forecast-cessation process. Their findings are consistent with the notion that interlocked directors serve as conduits for information sharing, which may result in the change of corporate disclosure policies. My discussion focuses on potential issues with the findings and implications for future study.

Keywords: Disclosure policy; Board interlocks; Forecast cessation; Board director (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G34 M41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s11142-014-9290-y

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