Political pressures and the evolution of disclosure regulation

Jeremy Bertomeu () and Robert P. Magee
Additional contact information
Jeremy Bertomeu: City University of New York
Robert P. Magee: Northwestern University

Review of Accounting Studies, 2015, vol. 20, issue 2, No 6, 775-802

Abstract: Abstract This paper examines the process that drives the formation and evolution of disclosure regulations. In equilibrium, changes in the regulation depend on the status quo, standard-setters’ political accountability and underlying objectives, and the cost and benefits of disclosure to reporting entities. Excessive political accountability need not implement the regulation preferred by diversified investors. Political pressures slow standard-setting and, if the standard-setter prefers high levels of disclosure, induce regulatory cycles characterized by long phases of increasing disclosure requirements followed by a sudden deregulation.

Keywords: Disclosure; Political; Certification; Financial reporting; Mandatory; Standard; Positive economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D21 D4 D7 G38 K22 M4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11142-014-9312-9 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reaccs:v:20:y:2015:i:2:d:10.1007_s11142-014-9312-9

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/accounting/journal/11142

DOI: 10.1007/s11142-014-9312-9

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Accounting Studies is currently edited by Paul Fischer

More articles in Review of Accounting Studies from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().