Legislators’ demand for firms’ financial statements: evidence from U.S. congressional redistricting events

Matthew Ma (), Jing Pan, Ethan Rouen and Laura Wellman
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Matthew Ma: Rutgers University
Jing Pan: Pennsylvania State University
Ethan Rouen: Harvard University
Laura Wellman: University of Oregon

Review of Accounting Studies, 2025, vol. 30, issue 4, No 18, 3815-3856

Abstract: Abstract We investigate whether U.S. House representatives and their staff seek financial information from constituent firms to inform their legislative decisions. We exploit shifts in U.S. congressional districts (i.e., the reconfiguration of federal district lines or redistricting) that introduce new constituent firms to legislators’ districts. To the extent that legislators and their staff collect and rely on firms’ financial statement information, we expect that a change in representation as a result of redistricting will result in a significant and observable change in searches for information about new constituent firms. Our evidence supports this prediction. We also find that the timing of searching coincides with legislators’ roll call votes, particularly ahead of more controversial bills and for bills lobbied by sample firms. Finally, we find that new constituent firms respond to increased information demands after a redistricting event by supplying more policy-relevant disclosures and increasing lobbying.

Keywords: Corporate disclosure; Redistricting; Lobbying; Legislators; Voting behavior (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D80 E61 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s11142-025-09891-7

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