Reputation Without Repeated Interaction: A Role for Public Disclosures

Steven T. Schwartz, Richard A. Young and Kristina Zvinakis
Additional contact information
Steven T. Schwartz: Binghamton University
Richard A. Young: The Ohio State University
Kristina Zvinakis: The Ohio State University

Review of Accounting Studies, 2000, vol. 5, issue 4, No 4, 375 pages

Abstract: Abstract This paper conductsan experiment to investigate the economic effect of public disclosureswithin a multi-move adaptation of the Prisoner's Dilemma game.The game, which has multiple equilibria, is characterized by:(1) a stochastic endpoint, (2) random, repeated pairings withanonymous partners, and (3) public disclosures concerning thecurrent partner's previous strategies. In the experiment, cooperationis improved by the disclosures. In addition, subjects cooperatemore frequently when encountering a player who has tended tocooperate in the past, and less frequently when encounteringa player who has tended to defect in the past. Delayed disclosureleads to levels of cooperation only slightly less than thoseobtained with timely disclosure.

Keywords: experimental economics; Prisoner's Dilemma; disclosure; reputation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2000
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1023/A:1026501807727 Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reaccs:v:5:y:2000:i:4:d:10.1023_a:1026501807727

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/accounting/journal/11142

DOI: 10.1023/A:1026501807727

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Accounting Studies is currently edited by Paul Fischer

More articles in Review of Accounting Studies from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().