Discussion of “Performance Evaluation and Corporate Income Taxes in a Sequential Delegation Setting”

Madhav V. Rajan ()
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Madhav V. Rajan: Stanford University

Review of Accounting Studies, 2003, vol. 8, issue 2, No 11, 319 pages

Abstract: Abstract Baldenius and Ziv (2003), emphasize the role played by corporate taxes in the context of a multi-period setting that features project selection and incentive issues. In this discussion, I employ a parametric example to illustrate the intuition behind their findings, as well as to delineate their incremental contribution and to speculate on the robustness of the results. I also highlight the differences between the residual income framework employed in their paper and traditional models of agency.

Keywords: Performance Evaluation; Traditional Model; Corporate Taxis; Project Selection; Residual Income (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1024425814902

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