Power and efficiency in production pillage games

James Jordan

Review of Economic Design, 2009, vol. 13, issue 3, 193 pages

Keywords: Conflict; Efficiency; Coalitional game; Pillage; Core; Stable set; Legitimacy; C71; D51; D61; D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-008-0056-5

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