Implementation of solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
Review of Economic Design, 2010, vol. 14, issue 1, 1-15
Keywords: Single-peaked preferences; Uniform rule; Nash implementability; Maskin monotonicity; No veto power; Strong monotonicity; C72; D63; D71; D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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