Cores of many-player games; nonemptiness and equal treatment

Myrna Wooders

Review of Economic Design, 2010, vol. 14, issue 1, 162 pages

Keywords: Core; Market games; Approximate cores; Equal treatment; Core convergence; Small group effectiveness; Symmetry; Per capita boundedness; Small group negligibility; Games with a continuum of players; C71; D71; C78; H41; D40; D50 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Working Paper: Cores of Many-Player Games; Nonemptiness and Equal Treatment (2009)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-009-0095-6

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