Nash implementation via simple stochastic mechanisms: strategy space reduction

Michele Lombardi

Review of Economic Design, 2012, vol. 16, issue 4, 297-309

Abstract: Benoît and Ok (Games Econ Behav 64:51–67, 2008 ) show that in a society with at least three agents any weakly unanimous social choice correspondence (SCC) is Maskin’s monotonic if and only if it is Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism (Benoît-Ok’s Theorem). This paper fully identifies the class of weakly unanimous SCCs that are Nash-implementable via a simple stochastic mechanism endowed with Saijo’s message space specification (Saijo in Econometrica 56:693–700, 1988 ). It is shown that this class of SCCs is equivalent to the class of SCCs that are Nash-implementable via Benoît-Ok’s Theorem. Copyright The Author(s) 2012

Keywords: Nash implementation; Strategy space reduction; Informational efficiency; Simple stochastic mechanisms; C72; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0117-7

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