The public release of information in first-price sealed-bid auctions

François Maréchal () and Pierre-Henri Morand ()

Review of Economic Design, 2012, vol. 16, issue 4, 323-330

Abstract: We determine the conditions under which the seller in a first-price sealed-bid auction has an incentive to reveal his private information about the mean of bidders’ valuations in order to increase his expected revenue. With risk-neutral bidders, we show that the seller’s expected revenue is higher when information is revealed. However, when bidders are risk-averse, this result does not necessarily hold; it depends on the bidders’ risk-aversion level and on the number of bidders. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2012

Keywords: Auctions; Information; Risk-aversion; D44; D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0115-9

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