An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear

Toyotaka Sakai

Review of Economic Design, 2013, vol. 17, issue 1, 17-26

Abstract: In a single item auction model that allows non-quasilinear preferences, we show that an auction rule satisfies weak envy-freeness for equals, strategy-proofness, and nonimposition if and only if it is a (generalized) second price auction. This characterization is established on a wide class of preference domains, including the quasilinear domain, a positive income effect domain, and a negative income effect domain. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Keywords: Non-quasilinear preference; Second price auction; Strategy-proofness; Equal treatment of equals; Fair allocation; D44; D63; C72; C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-012-0135-5

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