Maximally representative allocations for guaranteed delivery advertising campaigns

Randolph McAfee, Kishore Papineni and Sergei Vassilvitskii

Review of Economic Design, 2013, vol. 17, issue 2, 83-94

Abstract: There are around 400 advertising networks that match opportunities for “display” advertising, which include banner ads, video ads and indeed all ads other than text-based ads, on web pages and candidate advertisements. This is about a $${\$}25$$ billion business annually. The present study derives a method of pricing such advertisements based on their relative scarcity while ensuring that all campaigns obtain a reasonably representative sample of the relevant opportunities. The mechanism is well-behaved under supply uncertainty. A method based on the mechanism described in this paper was implemented by Yahoo! Inc. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Keywords: Advertising; Representativeness; Mechanism design; Market design; Bidding; Exchange; D02; M37 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-013-0141-2

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