Multiple and last-minute bidding in competing internet auctions

Marta Stryszowska ()

Review of Economic Design, 2013, vol. 17, issue 4, 273-305

Abstract: The present paper proposes a theoretical model of the equilibrium bidding behavior in simultaneous competing private-value Internet auctions such as those on eBay. It shows that last-minute bidding and multiple bidding, two commonly observed bidding strategies, arise in equilibrium. It also suggests that last-minute bidding may lead to inefficient outcomes. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2013

Keywords: Internet auctions; eBay; Multi-unit auctions; Simultaneous auctions; Last-minute bidding; Sniping; D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-013-0142-1

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