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Truth-telling and trust in sender–receiver games with intervention: an experimental study

Mehmet Gurdal, Ayca Ozdogan and Ismail Saglam

Review of Economic Design, 2014, vol. 18, issue 2, 83-103

Abstract: Recent experimental studies find excessive truth-telling in sender–receiver games. We show that this phenomenon is robust to the random intervention of a truthful regulator. In addition, intervention significantly increases the excessive trust of receivers while the overall percentage of truthful messages received does not change much with or without intervention. We offer a theoretical explanation for the behavior of senders and receivers, using a logit agent quantal response equilibrium (logit-AQRE) model incorporating a non-monetary lying cost for senders (like Peeters et al. in Scand J Econ 115(2):508–548, 2013 ). We show that our experimental findings are all consistent with the predictions of this model. Moreover, we find that the lying cost is significantly higher under intervention, implying that truthful intervention is beneficial for receivers and justified as a tool for policy makers acting on behalf of informationally inferior parties. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Keywords: Strategic information transmission; Truth-telling; Trust; Sender–receiver game; Intervention; C90; D63; D64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-013-0155-9

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