Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making
Sususmu Cato ()
Review of Economic Design, 2014, vol. 18, issue 4, 265-287
This paper examines an extended framework of Arrovian social choice theory. We consider two classes of values: consequential values and non-consequential values. Each individual has a comprehensive preference based on the two. Non-consequential values are assumed to be homogeneous among individuals. It is shown that a social ordering function satisfying Arrovian conditions must be non-consequential: a social comprehensive preference gives unequivocal priority to non-consequential values. We clarify the role of common preferences over non-consequential features. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014
Keywords: Non-consequentialism; Arrow’s impossibility theorem; Collective decision making; Welfarism; D63; D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reecde:v:18:y:2014:i:4:p:265-287
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
Review of Economic Design is currently edited by Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers
More articles in Review of Economic Design from Springer, Society for Economic Design
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().