A characterization of the asymmetric Nash solution
Review of Economic Design, 2015, vol. 19, issue 2, 167-171
The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution is characterized on the basis of independence of irrelevant alternatives, independence of equivalent utility representations, and a new axiom—moderate collective rationality. The latter is logically weaker than Roth’s (Math Oper Res 2:64–65, 1977 ) strong individual rationality and logically stronger than Anbarci and Sun’s (Soc Choice Welf 37:425–429, 2011 ) weakest collective rationality. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Keywords: Axioms; Bargaining; Asymmetric Nash solution; C78; D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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