Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems

Johannes Spinnewijn and Frans Spinnewyn ()

Review of Economic Design, 2015, vol. 19, issue 2, 116 pages

Abstract: We propose a simple mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players in subgame-perfect equilibrium. The mechanism incorporates two important features of negotiations; players can revise claims in an attempt to reach a compromise or pursue their claims in an ultimate take-it-or-leave-it offer. Players restrain their claims to avoid a weak bargaining position or their resistance to uncompromising behavior to acquire leadership. The Nash solution and the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution are implemented in the extreme cases when respectively no and all revisions are allowed. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Bargaining solutions; Nash program; Ultimatums; C78; D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems (2015)
Working Paper: Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems (2008)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-015-0168-7

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