Consistency of the Shapley NTU value in G-hyperplane games

M. Hinojosa, E. Romero-Palacios and J. Zarzuelo ()
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J. Zarzuelo: http://www.ehu.es/zarzuelo

Review of Economic Design, 2015, vol. 19, issue 4, 259-278

Abstract: We study the Shapley NTU solution on the class of ssNTU games for which the feasible set of the grand coalition is given by a hyperplane (G-hyperplane games). It is shown that, by considering payoff configurations as solution outcomes, the Shapley NTU value is consistent according to a generalization of the reduced game proposed by Hart and Mas-Colell to the class of NTU games. Moreover, the Shapley NTU solution is characterized on this class of NTU games by means of this consistency property plus some plausible axioms, namely: maximality, covariance, symmetry, a null-player axiom, and an additional axiom requiring certain coherence in the payoffs of the intermediate coalitions. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015

Keywords: Consistency; NTU games; Shapley NTU value; Shapley value; C71; C78 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-015-0172-y

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