New axioms for immediate acceptance

Yajing Chen ()
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Yajing Chen: East China University of Science and Technology

Review of Economic Design, 2016, vol. 20, issue 4, No 3, 329-337

Abstract: Abstract Following Kojima and Ünver (Econ Theory 55(3):515–544, 2014) and Afacan (Math Soc Sci 66(2):176–179, 2013), this paper provides two characterizations of the Boston school choice mechanism determined by the student-proposing immediate acceptance algorithm. A mechanism is the Boston mechanism if and only if it satisfies one of the following two groups of axioms: favoring higher ranks and weak fairness; favoring higher ranks, rank monotonicity, and rank rationality.

Keywords: Immediate acceptance algorithm; Favoring higher ranks; Characterization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-016-0194-0

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