EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Mechanisms for combinatorial auctions with budget constraints

Phuong Le ()
Additional contact information
Phuong Le: Stanford University

Review of Economic Design, 2017, vol. 21, issue 1, 1-31

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies combinatorial auctions with budget-constrained bidders from a mechanism design perspective. I search for mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, symmetric, non-wasteful and non-bossy. First focusing on the greedy domain, in which any increase in a bidder’s valuation always exceeds his budget, I derive the unique mechanism, called the Iterative Second Price Auction. For the general domain, however, no such mechanism exists.

Keywords: Combinatorial auctions; Budget constraints; Mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10058-016-0188-y Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:reecde:v:21:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10058-016-0188-y

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/economics/journal/10058

Access Statistics for this article

Review of Economic Design is currently edited by Atila Abdulkadiroglu, Fuhito Kojima and Tilman Börgers

More articles in Review of Economic Design from Springer, Society for Economic Design
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla ().

 
Page updated 2019-05-21
Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:21:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s10058-016-0188-y