Every member of the core is as respectful as any other

Yasemin Dede and Semih Koray ()
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Yasemin Dede: Bilkent University
Semih Koray: Bilkent University

Review of Economic Design, 2018, vol. 22, issue 1, No 3, 55-65

Abstract: Abstract We strategically separate different core outcomes. The natural counterparts of a core allocation in a strategic environment are the α-core, the β-core and the strong equilibrium, modified by assuming that utility is transferable in a strategic context as well. Given a core allocation ω of a convex transferable utility (TU) game $$v$$ v , we associate a strategic coalition formation game with $$ \left( {v, \omega } \right) $$ v , ω in which ω survives, while most other core allocations are eliminated. If the TU game is strictly convex, the core allocations respected by the TU-α-core, the TU-β-core and the TU-strong equilibrium shrink to ω only in the canonical family of coalition formation games associated with $$ \left( {v, \omega } \right) $$ v , ω . A mechanism, which strategically separates core outcomes from noncore outcomes for each convex TU game according to the TU-strong equilibrium notion is reported.

Keywords: TU game; Core; TU-α-core; TU-β-core; TU-strong equilibrium; 1.001; 3.007; 4.005 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-018-0211-6

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