Two-stage elimination contests with optimal head starts

Noam Cohen, Guy Maor and Aner Sela
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Noam Cohen: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev
Guy Maor: Ben-Gurion University of the Negev

Review of Economic Design, 2018, vol. 22, issue 3, No 5, 177-192

Abstract: Abstract We study two-stage elimination Tullock contests. In the first stage all the players compete against each other; then some advance to the second stage while the others are removed. The finalists compete against each other in the second stage, and one of them wins the prize. To maximize the expected total effort, the designer can give a head start to the winner of the first stage when he competes against the other finalists in the second stage. We show that the optimal head start, independent of the number of finalists, always increases the players’ expected total effort. We also show how the number of players and finalists affect the value of the optimal head start.

Keywords: Multi-stage contests; Tullock contests; Head starts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 D44 L12 O32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Working Paper: Two-Stage Elimination Contests with Optimal Head Starts (2016)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-018-0216-1

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