A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements

Alfredo Valencia-Toledo and Juan Vidal-Puga

Review of Economic Design, 2020, vol. 24, issue 1, No 4, 65-99

Abstract: Abstract We consider land rental between a single tenant and several lessors. The tenant should negotiate sequentially with each lessor for the available land. In each stage, we apply the Nash bargaining solution, as a short-cut to solving non-cooperative bargaining games. Our results imply that, when all land is necessary, a uniform price per unit is more favorable for the tenant than a lessor-dependent price. Furthermore, a lessor is better off with a lessor-dependent price only when negotiating first. For the tenant, lessors’ merging is relevant with lessor-dependent price but not with uniform price.

Keywords: Bargaining; Non-cooperative game; Nash solution; Land rental (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Working Paper: A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements (2019)
Working Paper: A sequential bargaining protocol for land rental arrangements (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00230-7

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