Contests with insurance

Yizhaq Minchuk () and Aner Sela
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Yizhaq Minchuk: Shamoon College of Engineering

Review of Economic Design, 2020, vol. 24, issue 1, No 1, 22 pages

Abstract: Abstract We study all-pay auctions under incomplete information in which contestants have non-linear effort functions. The designer offers the option of insurance for which a contestant pays a premium to the contest designer. If a contestant does not win he is reimbursed the cost of his effort. We demonstrate that contests with insurance may be profitable for a designer who wishes to maximize his expected revenue as based on the contestants’ expected total effort, the premium of the insured contestants, and their reimbursement.

Keywords: Contests; All-pay auctions; Reimbursement; Insurance; C72; D44 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Contests with Insurance (2017)
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00232-5

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