Decentralized college admissions under single application

Somouaoga Bonkoungou ()
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Somouaoga Bonkoungou: National Research University Higher School of Economics

Review of Economic Design, 2021, vol. 25, issue 1, No 3, 65-91

Abstract: Abstract This paper studies a decentralized college admissions game with single application motivated by college admissions in many countries such as Japan, Russia, South Korea and United States. Students sequentially apply to colleges, one application for each student, and commit to attend whenever they are admitted. We introduce a natural equilibrium refinement and describe the equilibrium behavior. It is a simple strategy that consists of running the well-known student-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm (DA) for modified preferences. Students and colleges are divided along the outcome of DA. Students find the outcome of every equilibrium at least as good as the outcome of DA, and colleges find the outcome of DA at least as good as the outcome of every equilibrium.

Keywords: College admission; Decentralized market; Deferred acceptance; Subgame perfect equilibrium; Refinement (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C78 I29 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-020-00241-4

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