Matching markets and cultural selection
Jiabin Wu ()
Review of Economic Design, 2021, vol. 25, issue 4, No 3, 267-288
Abstract We study the implications of two different matching mechanisms: bargaining in match (BIM) and binding agreement in the matching market (BAMM) in the context of cultural selection. Under BIM, matching across cultures is not operated through a well-regulated market, where agents’ payoffs are not determined by the market but through negotiation with their matched partners. Under BAMM, matching across cultures is operated through a formal market in which agents make binding agreements. We show that BIM results in inefficiency through cultural selection and possibly leads to assimilation, while BAMM restores efficiency and ensures cultural heterogeneity. The findings highlight the importance of regulating the matching market for multi-cultural societies.
Keywords: Matching markets; Bargaining; Cultural selection; Evolutionary game theory; C73; C78; Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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