Contests for catch shares

Kyung Baik and Youngseok Park ()
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Youngseok Park: Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

Review of Economic Design, 2022, vol. 26, issue 1, No 2, 23-42

Abstract: Abstract We study contests in which fishers (or players), in a fishery managed under a catch-share program, compete over catch shares by expending irreversible effort, and the fishery manager, influenced by the players’ effort, allocates their catch shares. We first show that the number of active players and their identities in each period depend only on the players’ marginal costs, and they remain exactly the same across all periods. Then, we show that, in each period, an active player with a lower marginal cost expends greater effort and secures a greater catch share than a player with a higher marginal cost. We also show that a player who expends zero effort due to his relatively high marginal cost ends up with a less and less catch share over time.

Keywords: Catch share; Rent-seeking behavior; Catch-share program; Contest; Inefficient fisher (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1007/s10058-021-00252-9

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